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David Schmidt is a graduate student here at KU, and has 
served with distinction as an instructor and as past president 
of GASP. David attended Bethel College and Harvard Divinity 
School prior to enrolling at KU, and also served time in the 
Congo as an alternative to military service. His essay, "Friend-
ship," also won an award from the Lewis Essay contest, sponsored 
by the school of religion. 
David's paper has also been delivered to a meeting of GASP; 
and Mike presented his paper at GASP's symposium on Freedom. 
It will be the policy of the contest in the future that the 
winning essay or essays will be presented to an open meeting of 
GASP. 
It is hoped that the response to the contest this year will 
be as enthusiastic as last; it is further hoped that it will be 
possible to increase the stipend associated with the contest at 
some (near) future date. 
Sincerely, 
Joe D. VanZandt 
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FRIENDSHIP 
David Schmidt 
In this paper I attempt to characterize friendship by begin-
ning with certain aspects which are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for friendship and ending with the sufficient conditions 
which specify the requirements for true friendship. With each 
succeeding condition there is an extensional diminution until those 
few who are real friends are characterized. There is also a pro-
gression from the most superficial types of friendship to the most 
meaningful. 
A pre-condition for friendship is a general "love" for mankind. 
A person with whom it is possible to be a friend must at least not 
have such an aversion to mixing with people and dealing with them 
in ordinary life that he completely isolates himself from them and 
becomes a hermit. There must be at least some elementary kind of 
trust which allows a person to become at least somewhat involved 
in dealings with other people. 
Friendship involves two persons who actively strive together 
for a good. What is required here is that the persons whom one 
calls friends are at least acquaintances who cooperate with some 
purpose in mind although the purpose may be differing in some 
sense. 1 This requirement is intensionally very small and exten-
sionally very great, since practically any association of two 
people qualifies and therefore practically everyone in the world 
would be a friend in some sense or other to someone. Two strangers 
who meet at an amusement park and who are arbitrarily put together 
to row to an island are friends to the extent that they are working 
together for the common goal of arriving at the island. Similarly 
members of the same bridge club or of the same church are friends 
if they are acquainted with one another. The goal of each person 
may be different, as, for example, in a business relationship in 
which one person buys something from another, but insofar as these 
two people cooperate together, their relationship is a friendship. 
In the buyer-seller relationship, each seeks a different good (one, 
money; the other, the commodity or service), but both profit 
(presumably) and both cooperate, which makes it a friendship. The 
relationship may be beneficial to the people involved but harmful 
to others, such as among a band of train robbers, and yet since 
the members of the band cooperate together, they are, to that extent, 
friends. A further example would be a sexual relationship in which 
each partner wanted only to satisfy his own desires. 
Formally speaking, as soon as the activity is over, the people 
cease to be friends, which means that many superficial, fleeting 
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relationships will be classified as friendships during the brief 
time the two people are associated with another, but when the 
business deal is closed, or the two rowers have reached the island 
or the church members have quit the church, then the friendship is 
terminated. If the activity is more long-term, then the friend-
ship is a more enduring one. 
Since this type of friendship is a kind of friendship of use-
fulness in which the goal of each individual, whether shared with 
others or not, is what is important in each, a good man can be a 
friend to an evil man, since there may be some interests in which 
they could cooperate. Some activities could be done together while 
the individuals have different interests. A good man might read 
aloud a contract to an evil blind man because he enjoys the company 
of the blind man, and the blind man has an interest in the material 
read.12 
There is a problem which arises with the use of this criterion 
for friendship and it is that two persons could be striving for a 
good with one liking the other but the latter hating the former. 
Since calling these two people friends would seem very odd, a 
further requirement is necessary. 
Friendship must be a reciprocal well-wishing. As mentioned 
in the pre-condition for friendship, there must be some desire to 
mix with other men, and if this desire becomes an active wishing 
well towards the other beyond just wishing well in a purely 
commerical sense (a commercial sense would be a creditor wishing 
well to his debtor only to get his money back), then the relation 
begins to become more like a friendship in the ordinary sense of 
the word. If one person actively wishes well to another person 
who dislikes him, is it good usage to call the former a friend? 
That would be contradictory since he is at the same time a friend 
(since he wishes well to the other) and an enemy (because hated by 
the other). 3 Therefore there should be a mutual well wishing 
before two persons are to be called friends. 
A person who hates all mankind can be no one's friend since 
instead of rejoicing with someone's happiness and fortune this 
type of person rejoices at their misfortunes. There are different 
types of hating mankind: one is actively doing evil to others; 
another is gossiping, which, in always finding the worst motives 
in everyone, undermines other people's confidence in all mankind 
and shows a hatred for mankind; another is the sin of pride in 
which a person esteems himself above all mankind and thereby uses 
people as means and not as ends (in Kant's phraseology). For there 
to be friendship, this kind of wishing ill to mankind must give way 
to a well-wishing for mankind. 4 Before friendship can be possible, 
one must recognize his need for other people, and rid himself of 
pride. If pride is never overcome, meaning that a person continues 
to believe that other people are inferior to him, this is at worst 
a desire to use people and at best a kind of attitude of self-
sufficiency. In either case this person can never be a friend to 
others since he has not recognized the right of people to make 
demands upon him, that is, has not recognized the need to wish 
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other people well (he only wishes himself well). Losing one's 
pride is a humbling experience because everyone would like to 
believe that he is self-sufficient, but it is necessary to lose 
one's pride in order to develop a relationship based on well-
wishing. 
Friendship must be based on something beautiful in the other 
person. To wish well to another person not merely in a commercial 
sense means that one must somehow find something attractive in 
the other person. To pass from a general love of mankind to an 
active wishing well to another presupposes some kind of attraction. 
There is something of beauty in the other person which exerts a 
pull. In the types of friendship that I would call rather super-
ficial, the attraction could be physical or in a chic manner of 
doing something whereas the more solid a friendship is the more 
virtuous it becomes. Examples of the more solid types would be 
friendships based on frankness, ability to keep confidences, and 
thoughtfulness of one person towards another.6 
I believe the higher types of friendship to be based upon the 
moral and intellectual beauty of a person. What is most beautiful 
in another person is the ability to communicate in such a way that 
it opens up one's sensitivities in a new way by expressing what one 
has been trying to clarify to oneself. 
Friendship is a "procreation in the beautiful (Symposium)." 
Whatever the beauty in the other person is, friendship should be 
a production of something of value by the two persons who are 
mutually attracted. Plato understands the sexual relation as 
being really done to bring about progeny.^ Another type of "pro-
creation in the beautiful" is the student-teacher relationship in 
which the student is attracted by the wisdom of the teacher and 
the teacher can help occasion the birth of knowledge in the mind 
of the student.8 
A further example would be two persons of roughly equal wisdom 
and sensitivities who communicate with each other very well and 
who sensitize each other's moral consciousness. By that I mean 
those who work unselfishly for each other's personal development 
have that sort of relationship. Here the relationship is not 
between superior and inferior but between two persons of roughly 
equal capacity who bring out the best in each other and create 
something better than either one could have done alone. He is a 
social being and therefore in this type of association, he can 
realize his highest potential as a sensitive moral being whereas 
if he remained a hermit all his life there would be very little 
"human" growth, even though there might be some kind of intellect-
ual growth if he had access to books. Only within a society of 
people who are honest with each other does a kind of moral growth 
take place in which a person can realize the subjective, or selfish 
nature of any of the principles of his actions. As Kant has 
written, one must descend into the hell of one's subjectivity to 
become virtuous,9 and to me it would seem that in some cases the 
only way to do this is in the fellowship of a friend with whom one 
can be honest. By expressing one's own thoughts to another, they 
become clearer to oneself, but also in having longterm personal 
contact with someone else a person recognizes how self-centered 
most of his actions are, by seeing his selfishness reflected in 
the responses of the other. 
This sort of friendship would include a sharing of judgments 
(and one would have to be willing to accept the other's judgments 
in return) about the morality of each other's actions. The judg-
ments would have to be forwarded in a humble spirit since one 
rarely knows what really prompts one's own actions, and so it would 
even be more unlikely that one would know the motives of another 
person. Moreover the judgments should be proposed in a supportive 
climate so that the other person need not react to one as a subject 
but rather to the principle on which his action was based (especial-
ly if the judgment is unfavorable). If there is any shame to be 
felt it should not be the shame caused by their subjective relation-
ship but rather shame in comparing the principle he actually follow-
ed with one that he should have followed. 
I do not believe that one can make another person into a moral 
being by praise or blame because the moral person is autonomous 
which means that the moral agent must choose his own actions. If 
praise or blame could make a person do an action in a kind of 
simple behaviorist way, he would not be the cause of his action, 
the indoctrination would be the cause. However, even though one 
cannot make another person moral, one can be occasion for the other 
person to learn more about his own motives (by conversation or 
example) and thereby can help the other to become more moral. 
Rationality and Friendship. There are two senses in which 
one becomes more a friend in becoming more rational. One is the 
above sense in which one's motives become more clear to oneself 
and thereby can be corrected or reinforced (an unarticulated motive 
if bad would not be correctable), but there is also another reason 
why friendship must have a rational base. If all there was to 
friendship was an egoistic desire for sex, the bond uniting the two 
people would be only the irrational connection of a physical drive 
(or passion), and in this case one would not be said to choose his 
friends, since there would be no rational element involved at all. 
Or if one stipulated not sexual desire but instinctual ties based 
on a blood relation and the affection which comes from being mem-
bers of a same family as being the bases of true friendship, here 
again one would not choose his friends because being born into one 
family or another is purely accidental (from a moral standpoint). 
Even though friendships could develop from these relationships 
(since one could choose to wish well to one's mistress or family 
members) the fact that there is no choice made by the individual 
concerned would preclude them from being friendships. 
To move away from an irrationalist account of friendship, some 
other basis of friendship must be possible, and Plato and Kant 
assume in their accounts that man can act by reason but give different 
accounts of how this is possible.10 Assuming that an account can be 
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given, there are then several types of people: those for whom the 
appetitive part is never mastered (and one may question whether 
these people are really human beings at all), those for whom the 
appetitive part is mastered except for occasional lapses, and those 
for whom the appetitive part is entirely controlled. According to 
Plato, only those persons who have completely mastered the appeti-
tive part are capable of becoming most truly friends of the other.H 
Those who occassionally slip and let their passions carry them into 
a physical relationship, but who do not have their hearts in it and 
repent later also have a very honorable relationship, but not as 
high as the true lover, the philosopher. 
If Plato means that one must be able to control all his desires 
and to decide which acts he will do, that is one thing; but if he 
means that it is not possible in principle to be a morally good man 
and to have any sexual relationship, that is quite another. It 
would seem possible to have sexual relations with one's wife while 
remaining moral and still having a friendship of the highest level 
(although, of course I would agree that a high type of friendship 
could not be based on sex and physical desire). It would seem to 
me that one could be friends (in the sense of having the best 
interests of the other at heart) and lovers (in the sexual sense) 
at the same time.12 
In the best of all possible worlds, one would be able not only 
to choose his friends (which presupposes a reasoned choice), but 
one would be able to choose all his actions (and thus be able to 
give a rational account of them to his friend when sharing with 
him) . 
The highest type of friendship is one in which two persons 
equally share their deepest moral feelings and thoughts with each 
other. The relationship mentioned previously in which two persons 
share their true opinions with each other is a necessary part of 
true friendship, and it is very difficult though not impossible to 
achieve. In this kind of relationship one runs the highest risks 
because a person in opening himself up by sharing may be rejected, 
abused, or ridiculed, but this type of relationship if successful 
is the most liberating and profitable type. Dialogue brings to 
light motives and feelings that one could not have found otherwise, 
and since knowing oneself (one's motives) is a necessary part of 
acting ethically, more can be gained from this kind of friendship 
than from any o t h e r . " 
Duty becomes often more constraining in this relationship due 
to the difficulty in being honest. The friendship grows in propor-
tion to the honesty of both parties, and can die if it becomes 
evident that the other person is not being honest. Other friend-
ships are easier to establish: friendships based on pleasure, use-
fulness, or even at times friendships based on other persons' 
interests (some people find it easy to subordinate their interests 
and will humor other people, but these same people would find it 
very difficult to get involved in a sharing relationship due to 
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the risks involved) . Once one has had this type of honest, sharing 
relationship the other types of friendship begin to appear to be 
not very worthy friendships at all, and the ordinary type of 
socializing that one does appears even to be an evasion of one's 
responsibility to have this kind of depth friendship with others. 
Since in this sort of relationship one has the obligation to 
share one's judgments of the other with the other, and since one 
seeks out the most virtuous and trustworthy people one knows, the 
fear of rejection (or loss of respect) is maximized but the fear 
of being misused (or misrepresented to others) is minimized. One 
always fears that when one's true motives become known to others 
(especially very virtuous people) there will be a loss of respect 
and perhaps rejection, but on the other hand, if the person is 
virtuous one has less fear of his divulging of confidences. The 
other person being virtuous and having plumbed the abyss of his 
subjective motives also, one can fear that he will continually 
find that what one thought was a worthy motive in doing something 
was really a selfish inclination. He opens himself up to the same 
risks and so there is a kind of equality. 
Friendship is not only this type of friendship which is per-
haps the same as Kant's moral friendship, but to be the highest 
type of friendship it must have this element in it. A friend of 
this type should also care about the well-being of the other and 
materially or spiritually help him in need. The friendship cannot 
be based merely on the prudential consideration that one will be-
friend another since one may have need of him someday (a friend-
ship of utility), although in becoming a friend to someone one 
does recognize that he himself is not self-sufficient. If one did 
approach friendship from prudential considerations, one would have 
the intention of obligating another whenever one did anything for 
another person. One should rather do things disinterestedly for 
other people. 
Kant seems to believe that the initiator of a friendship 
eternally obligates the other because he has the priority of merit 
(deserving well) from the other.14 The duty of gratitude commands 
respect from the receiver of any benefit, and since respecting 
another automatically lowers one's own self-esteem with respect to 
the other, the other is viewed as one's superior. It would thereby 
seem impossible to meet the requirements he gives for friendship 
("Friendship (in its perfection) is the union of two persons through 
equal mutual love and respect.")15 Perhaps Kant is only critical 
in this passage of what he calls pragmatic love, in which doing 
something for another's well-being from love obligates him to do 
something commensurate in return (and upon doing this, the other 
person is obligated to do something in return, etc.), but as it is 
stated it would seem to apply to his concept of moral friendship 
also. If so, it would seem that the one who initiated a moral 
friendship would be the superior in the relationship and could never 
be equal (in merit) . 
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In the relationship that I have sketched above in the paper, 
I believe that the two persons should be equals in their willing-
ness to share and that neither should be eternally obligated to 
another (a problem in Kant's view since there would be no way to 
discharge one's obligation). One would always consider oneself to 
be in some way inferior and the friendship would be more constrain-
ing than liberating. I agree with the ideal of moral friendship 
as Kant has outlined it, although his conception of it seems to be 
a relationship without love (that is, taking it upon oneself to be 
interested in the ends and goals of other men). It seems to me 
that a relationship in which one could be interested in the ends 
and goals of the other would coexist with the moral friendship. 
That is, in Kant's terms I believe that moral friendship and 
pragmatic friendship would be part of the same relationship and 
that (practical) love can be a part of moral friendship.16 
In my view, friendship is not so much an end in itself as a 
means to becoming more morally sensitive and thus gaining more 
self-knowledge.1' One needs people but does not use them (as a 
businessman would or a man governed by hubris) whereas friendships 
of utility do often use people. In this relationship the persons 
are ends in themselves since each is interested in the moral growth 
of the other, and to grow morally (in the sense of gaining self-
knowledge) requires other people.1° 
Friendship, though having no direct moral relationship to 
another person can in fact serve a quasi-moral role. Visiting 
a person very sick and discouraged in a hospital, who is thinking 
of suicide, can perhaps remind him of happier times shared together, 
buttress his courage by reinforcing his feelings of self-esteem, 
and with this kind of spirit his reason can assume its proper role 
again. Friendship plays a vital role in providing the occasion 
for a person to become more virtuous or to remain virtuous. 
What is loved about another person is the fact that one will 
receive a fair and sympathetic hearing (as well as the fact that 
one can learn from and be inspired by the latter) which means that 
whenever communication is possible friendship is possible.19 It 
is difficult to find people with whom one can reveal one's inner 
thoughts since it is difficult to find trustworthy people, but it 
is not impossible. One can surmount the inclinations which would 
lead a person to adopt friendships based only on pleasure and 
utility, and one can adopt a truly moral friendship with another 
if one has the courage. 
University of Kansas 
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NOTES 
If this requirement were not placed on friendship, two 
persons who are strangers to one another but who are working toward 
a common goal would be considered friends. Say, for example, the 
goal were world peace and the persons working toward it were the 
diplomats of two countries, and the diplomats did not know each 
other, if one did not require that friends be at least acquaintances, 
one would consider them to be friends. They may be potential friends 
but it is not proper to call them friends, 
o 
Aristotle believes that friendships either between evil men 
or an evil man and a good man are the most unstable kind since evil 
men are at variance with themselves, which makes their desires and 
wishes the most unstable among men. 
3 
This seems to be the logic of Plato's objection to this move 
in the Lysis, and the same objection applies if one wants to call 
the beloved, rather than the lover, a friend. The relationship 
between Hippothales and Lysis is of this unrequited nature. 
4 
Kant has criticized the tendency to gossip and believes that 
one should do the opposite—believe the better motives about others 
until proven wrong instead of believing the worst. Believing the 
best promotes a general love of mankind which is helpful for 
morality. 
5 
Aristotle raises a host of practical problems about wishing 
well to others. A friend cannot be absent too long or the wishing 
well will become inactive. The wishing well cannot be just a pass-
ing fancy (as when one is impressed by the performance of an 
athlete, one wishes him well, but because this is only an empty 
wish without any other activity on one's part, it remains just a 
passing fancy). He believes however that these passing fancies 
could be the start of a friendship. 
6Aristotle believed that in the highest types of friendships, 
what is loved in the other person is his character (that is, of a 
good person), and since character is something which is as permanent 
as anything that can be found in people, this type of friendship is 
the most permanent and genuine. He considered friendships of 
utility and pleasure to be less permanent since needs and pleasures 
change. 
^Plato links the desire for sex to a desire for progeny which 
is really a yearning for immortality. In this way animals also yearn 
for immortality. It would seem to me that if this were true, it 
would be hard to separate this from pride and if pride were there 
love would not be present. 
14 
In the Symposium Plato believes that in the life of the 
highest type of lover there is a progression beginning with the 
appreciation of (a) one beautiful body which then progresses to 
an appreciation of all beautiful bodies, (b) appreciation of the 
higher beauty of the soul (which can be in the husk of an ugly 
body), (c) laws and institutions, (d) the sciences which liberate 
him even further from individual objects, laws, and institutions, 
and (e) finally the apprehension of the single form of beauty 
which embodies no visible form whatever but is seen by the eye of 
reason alone. 
9 
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue (New 
York: The Bobbs-Merri11 Co. Inc., 1964), p. 104. 
*^In the Phaedrus Plato gives an account in the form of a 
metaphor. The soul is divided up into three parts: a charioteer 
and two steeds. The one is unruly and ugly (the passionate or 
appetitive element in man) and one well-disciplined and beautiful. 
The unruly steed upon sighting someone physically beautiful rushes 
to approach the beauty and to possess it whereas the charioteer, 
awed by the reflection of the divine embodied in the person stays 
back in awe and reverence. Since the unruly horse charges head-
long toward the beauty (perceiving no divinity in it), the chario-
teer must brutally beat and restrain it. Eventually the steed 
stops from fear of being beaten even further, and after repeated 
attempts by the unruly steed to free itself from the charioteer's 
control, it is finally controllable and quivers in fear at the 
approach of the beauty. 
Kant believes that insofar as man is moral his actions are 
self-caused and reason does control them. How it is possible that 
reason is not always in control is not explained. 
**The Symposium can be understood as an attempt to present 
Socrates as the paradigm of a true friend (lover). Alcibiades 
slept with him and yet there was no physical love involved, and 
thus Socrates is presented as one who can resist even the most 
tempting allurements of the sensual world (since in the Phaedrus 
it was hardest to control the appetitive part of man (unruly 
steed) when the beautiful person was also attracted to it, and 
Alcibiades presents himself as doing everything he could to attract 
Socrates which means that Socrates has passed the hardest test). 
R. G. Bury has suggested this interpretation of the Symposium 
in his The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 
1909), p. lxv. 
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Plato is more interested in a transcendent good which is divine 
in nature and only seen by reason. If desire and passion were in-
cluded in the conception of the good that would imply a lack, 
which would be characteristic of human and not gods. Therefore, 
the good should not have to depend in any way on passion. 
15 
Plato does not emphasize this kind of friendship to the same 
degree as Kant. Plato considers it a step toward the Good and it 
occupies only a second place in progress toward the Good as 
appreciation of the higher beauty of the soul in the Symposium 
(210 b-c) . The progress toward the good is really a progress 
away from the individuals and toward one science of the good 
through the dialectic, and since it passes through the stages of 
appreciation of institutions and all the sciences until one arrives 
at the one science of the good, there is an intellectualism (the 
good is the highest concept uniting the others and giving truth to 
all) which is not present in Kant. Kant believes that the principle 
of morality is present in all people and with a bit of clarification 
can be made explicit, and therefore does not need this same degree 
of intellectualism. People are not needed in the same way in Plato 
and Kant. Plato is attracted to other people so that together 
they can give birth to the highest conception of the good. For 
Kant two people can have a rather clear conception of the good for 
them (their duty) since all people have a sense of duty, but this 
sense of duty is a burden on them which sharing helps relieve, 
enabling them to act morally with a lighter heart. There is an 
intellectual element (finding the right maxim), but that is general-
ly not the basic problem. The problem generally is to subordinate 
and eliminate the pathelogical maxims by the categorical imperative. 
14 
The other person has a duty of gratitude, and in fact this 
is a sacred duty which means that "the obligation regarding it can 
never be wholly discharged by any act commensurate with it (and 
for this reason the one obligated always remains obligated)." 
Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Inc., 1964), p. 119-20. 
1 5Ibid., p. 135. 
^Perhaps Kant believes that the two can go together too, but 
if so I have difficulty understanding the role of obligation in 
that friendship. 
17 
By saying this I agree more with Plato than Aristotle. In 
a sense Aristotle seems to hold that friendship is an end in itself 
since friendship would hold the state together even without justice 
(if I understand rightly), whereas for Plato there is no friendship 
at all without justice, and friendship through the dialectic is a 
means of finding true beauty and justice. A problematic aspect of 
the relation between justice and friendship is found in Aristotle. 
He implies in his discussion of justice and friendship that the 
relation of friendship to justice is intensive and extensive, i.e., 
one has more obligation to favor one's friends. If this means that, 
everything being equal, one should help one's friends rather than 
strangers, this is acceptable; but if taken to mean that one has 
no obligation to enlarge his circle of acquaintances, this becomes 
problematic. There are duties toward a stranger too. If everyone 
chose always to help only his friends, strangers would never be 
helped. 
16 
For Aristotle other people were necessary because virtue 
was an activity and others were necessary so that a virtuous man 
could continue exercising his virtue. 
19 
This can provide a criterion for practically deciding 
whether friendship is still possible. An example would be pro-
vided by the case in which a person was paralyzed to such an ex-
tent that he could do nothing but blink his eyes in agreement or 
disagreement when listening to another, and in this case the role 
of confidant could still be fulfilled by him and friendship would 
still be possible. If a person were in such a state that he could 
make no indication whatsoever of having received any communication 
from another person (in a coma) and if it were known that the 
person would never come out of that state, then perhaps the friend-
ship would be terminated. I doubt that this could ever be known, 
however. 
